

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

PRIVATE  
ENDC/PV.81  
5 September 1962  
ENGLISH

---

APR 2 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 5 September 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman

Mr. M. MALITZA

(Romania)

62-21844

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO

Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. V. TYLNER

Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Mr. G.D. COMMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAGIATI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BOBODYCZ  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. A.M. SHEVCHENKO  
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON  
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the eighty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I want to draw the attention of the Committee to a document (ENDC/61) which has been circulated and which contains the draft report to the United Nations recommended by the two co-Chairmen.

The first speaker for this afternoon is the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, upon whom I now call.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to make a statement regarding further consideration of the problem of stopping nuclear tests.

Being anxious to achieve the speediest possible settlement of controversial issues and to prepare an agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government agrees that the three-Power Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should not interrupt its work while the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is in recess.

The Soviet Government considers that all the possibilities now exist for concluding an appropriate agreement, if the Western Powers approach this question in the same realistic way as the Soviet Union. In this connexion the Soviet Government deems it necessary to emphasize that the negotiations in the Sub-Committee should be conducted on the basis of the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) or on the basis of the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28).

The United States and United Kingdom proposals, set forth in their draft treaties of 27 August (ENDC/58 and 59), cannot serve as a basis for settling controversial issues.

Our delegation would also like to emphasize that, while the Soviet Government agrees that the Sub-Committee should not interrupt its work, at the same time it considers that the continuation of the Sub-Committee's work should in no way hamper consideration of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Government will base itself on that assumption.

Now I shall pass on to the next parts of the Soviet delegation's statement.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Today we have listened with interest to statements by the representatives of Bulgaria and Mexico (ENDC/PV.80 pp.22-30 and pp.31-43), and we shall carefully study their views. As regards the statements of the United Kingdom and United States representatives (*ibid.*, pp.5-21 and pp.44-53), we intend to deal with these at the end of our statement today.

The Soviet delegation would like to begin its statement today with some additional comments on the remarks made by Mr. Dean, the United States representative, at recent meetings of the Committee.

Mr. Dean spared no words in his attempt to prove that the United States is pursuing a peace-loving policy, is not threatening any one's security and is not preparing any military plans constituting a danger to other people, including any plans for a preventive nuclear war. Mr. Dean has tried to contest the numerous facts cited in the Committee which show that United States policy is in fact creating a threat of war, and is the main obstacle preventing a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. The United States representative tried, in particular, to refute the obvious fact that American military bases on the territories of foreign States serve as bridgeheads for aggression and provocative acts against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries.

In this connexion, I should like to bring to the notice of members of the Committee the contents of an important State document -- the protest note addressed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States on 4 September 1962. I quote:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America.

"According to verified information, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane, at 7.21 p.m. Moscow time on Aug. 30 this year, intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union in the Far East, sixty-five kilometres east of the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and overflew Soviet territory and territorial waters for nine minutes.

"This gross violation of the State frontier of the Soviet Union by an American reconnaissance plane was obviously provocative in nature.

7

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

"The serious international complications produced by Powers' espionage flight in a U-2 plane in May 1960, and the world-wide indignation aroused by the perfidy of the former United States Administration, which was then exposed for all the world to see, are common knowledge. These aggressive actions of the Eisenhower Administration wrecked the summit meeting, sharply aggravated the entire international situation, intensified the concern of the peoples of all countries for the destinies of the world, and became a heavy burden on the relations between the USSR and the United States.

"This is why the Soviet Government received with satisfaction the statement by President Kennedy in January last year that he had issued an order not to resume U-2 flights, and to prevent violations by American planes of the State frontiers of the Soviet Union.

"In connexion with the new case of gross violation by an American U-2 plane of the Soviet air space, the legitimate question arises: What is this -- revival of the old piratic practice of the previous Government, condemned by President Kennedy himself, or a provocative action of the bellicose United States quarters which would like to create a new international conflict, like the conflict of 1960, and heat the atmosphere to the maximum once again?

"The United States Government must give a clear answer to this question.

"News is being received of late about the activation of American reconnaissance U-2 planes near the frontiers of the Soviet Union. U-2 aircraft have again appeared on the air bases of Britain; reconnaissance aircraft of the same type, U-2, are stationed at American bases in Japan, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and undertake flights from these bases.

"Approximately the same versions concerning the purposes of these flights as the ones advanced by Eisenhower's Government, until it was caught red-handed on the spot of the crime, are being circulated again.

"The United States Government must realize in what a position it places its allies. The Soviet Government had warned most seriously in its time about the extremely grave consequences confronting the countries

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

whose Governments grant their territory to American warplanes for the preparation and launching of invasions into the confines of the USSR. It has also warned that if such provocations are repeated, the Soviet Government would be compelled to take appropriate retaliatory measures, including the rendering harmless of war bases used against the Soviet Union. It is superfluous to mention that these warnings remain fully in force.

"The Soviet Government lodges a resolute protest with the United States Government in connexion with the new gross violation by an American reconnaissance plane of the Soviet Union's state frontier. It expects the United States Government to punish strictly the persons guilty of organizing this flight of the American U-2 plane and to take immediate measures to prevent future violations of the Soviet airspace.

"If the United States Government does not do this, the Soviet Government will take measures which it deems necessary to insure the security of its frontiers in case of new violations. At the same time, the Soviet Government reserves the right to raise the question of United States aggressive actions at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"Moscow, 4 September 1962."

We believe that the incursion by an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft into the air space of the USSR is a striking illustration, which helps us to understand the purposes underlying the statements of the United States representative here in the Committee about the so-called "peaceful intentions" of the United States of America and about its alleged lack of any designs aimed against peace-loving States. It is also a clear illustration of the purposes for which American military bases have been established on the territories of other countries.

Now we should like to make some comments on the questions which Mr. Lall, the Indian representative, addressed to both sides on 3 September in regard to items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of document ENDC/52, that is, disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and disarmament measures in regard to conventional armaments (ENDC/PV.78, pp.31 et seq.).

It must be noted that the questions put by Mr. Lall are of a serious nature and that they deal with important aspects of the problem under discussion. The

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Soviet delegation intends to study these questions in detail, and will now confine itself to some preliminary remarks.

The first group of questions put by Mr. Lall dealt with disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. Mr. Lall observed that while one side -- I think all members of the Committee will understand which side -- proposes to treat such vehicles merely as a part of the armaments to be reduced percentage-wise rather than as a separate category of armaments, that same side has asked the other side for a list of delivery systems. In this connexion the Indian representative asked whether the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles could be solved if such a list were furnished, and also could not such a list be drawn up, and, if so, when could it be drawn up? (ibid., pp. 32-33).

As regards the Soviet Union, our position on this matter is perfectly clear. We are in favour of the total destruction of delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament and, consequently, in favour of freeing mankind from the threat of a destructive nuclear war as quickly as possible. We do not see any difficulties in the practical implementation of this most important disarmament measure in the first stage. We are prepared to assume the obligation to carry out this measure in the first stage if, of course, the same obligation is assumed by all States.

But, as the discussions in the Committee have shown, the Western Powers do not wish to do this. To justify themselves they put forward the artificial argument that it would be difficult to distinguish delivery vehicles from conventional armaments. It is precisely under this pretext that the Western Powers are trying to side-track the Committee from the broad highway of considering and working out measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, into the quagmire of discussions on calibres, aiming sights and other purely technical details.

As we have already pointed out earlier, the Soviet Union is not at all opposed to taking part in agreeing lists of delivery vehicles, when the time comes for that, when the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles in the first stage has itself been decided in principle.

There can be no doubt that in that case the most detailed lists of delivery vehicles will be agreed very quickly. But we have already been working here in the Committee for nearly half a year and up till now not only has no agreement been reached on the destruction of delivery vehicles, but even the positions on this cardinal question of the first stage have not become any closer. For this reason we say: let us, at this stage of the negotiations, exert all our efforts to reach

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

a solution in principle of the question of eliminating delivery vehicles in the first stage, and then we shall be able to carry on a purposeful, concrete discussion of technical details, including those of control, with the assistance of experts, scientists and military specialists. It is then that detailed lists of armaments of various types will be needed.

As to whether acceptance by the United States of our proposal for the complete elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage would make it easier to draw up a list of delivery vehicles at the present stage of the negotiations, that is a question which should be addressed to the United States delegation. Up to now the United States delegation has stated that, whatever precisions and clarifications we may offer in connexion with our proposal, it will not conduct negotiations on the basis of our proposal.

As to whether the United States side explained at the time when the basic principles (ENDC/5) were agreed upon last year that it did not regard the separate inclusion in these principles of item 3(c) -- elimination of means of delivery -- as a commitment to deal with delivery systems for nuclear weapons as a separate category, we should like to offer just a small piece of information. The text of the basic principles agreed at the bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1961 was submitted at these discussions by the United States, and not by the Soviet, side; we accepted it without amendments, insisting only on the deletion of the item relating to control over armaments.

The second group of questions put by Mr. Lall (ENDC/PV.78, pp.35-36), dealt with the reduction of conventional armaments. As Mr. Lall said, he bases himself on the postulate that any build-up of armaments would be a countervailing force to disarmament measures and should not be permitted. We, of course, support this view. The Soviet Union believes that the question of military production should be settled first and foremost on the basis of complete cessation of the production of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the very first stage. By this we mean complete cessation of the production not only of the weapons themselves which can be used as a means of delivery, but also of any parts of such weapons. All military production facilities engaged exclusively in producing means of delivery must be dismantled, and machine-tools and general-purpose equipment should be switched to industries producing goods for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The complete elimination in the first stage of the industrial basis for the production of means of delivery is the very foundation and essence of the Soviet Union's position in regard to the cessation of armament production. We consider that complete cessation of the production of means of delivery will considerably simplify, and will not in the least complicate, the necessary control measures. To this question put by the Indian representative, we give straight away a positive answer without any reservation.

As regards the production of conventional armaments which, although they are considerably inferior to nuclear weapons in their destructive power, are nevertheless an essential part of the military arsenals of States, we consider that this question should be settled on the basis of the fundamental aim to bring about a strict limitation of the production of conventional armaments already in the first stage, while even more far-reaching measures would be taken in the second stage of disarmament. We agree that, from the very beginning of the first stage, it is essential to prohibit the construction of new facilities for armaments production, or any increase in the productive capacity of existing facilities of this type. In the same way, from the beginning of the first stage, there must be no re-equipment of the armed forces of States with improved types of conventional armaments. Reduction of the production of conventional armaments, according to our draft treaty (ENDC/2 and Add.1), is to be carried out primarily through the dismantling of plants or workshops engaged exclusively in the production of conventional armaments or -- where possible -- through the conversion of plants engaged in military production to the production of goods for peaceful uses.

It goes without saying that the inspectors of the international disarmament organization will be fully entitled to carry out on-site verification to ensure that plants engaged in military production have been dismantled or converted to peaceful production, in accordance with the declarations submitted to the international disarmament organization by all Parties to the treaty at the beginning of the first stage. States will also submit to the international disarmament organization statements on the nature of production at plants converted to production for peaceful purposes, and the international disarmament organization will have to verify these statements on an agreed basis, to ensure that there is no resumption of military production. Those are our preliminary answers to Mr. Lall's questions.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I shall now state the Soviet delegation's views in regard to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. We realize, of course, that before the forthcoming recess in the Committee's work, during which the problems of disarmament will be considered by the United Nations General Assembly, it will hardly be possible for the Committee to discuss every aspect of the problem of nuclear disarmament measures in the first stage. Nevertheless, we think it would be useful to start this discussion, since nuclear disarmament is the central problem in the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR emphasized in his statement of 10 July,

"The pivot and core of disarmament is the banning and complete destruction of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/47, p.10)

It would not be an exaggeration to say that a radical solution to the question of banning and destroying all nuclear weapons at the disposal of States is, in the world of today, the most cherished hope and desire of the peoples of all countries. They are demanding that humanity should be delivered as quickly as possible from the threat of a destructive thermonuclear war. The peoples of the whole world realize that the biblical story of the ashes of the furnace which once fell upon the land of the Pharaohs would seem like a simple children's fairy tale compared with the catastrophe and the nightmares of a thermonuclear war, which could turn whole countries into radioactive ruins and put back the clock whole centuries for mankind.

Everyone is familiar with the statements of many distinguished political leaders in favour of reaching immediately an agreement to destroy all nuclear weapons. Many delegations here in this Committee too have adopted a similar unequivocal position in this regard.

It has fallen to the lot of our generation to eradicate the most terrible threat which mankind has ever encountered in the whole history of its existence -- the threat of a thermonuclear war. This problem can only be settled on the basis of banning and completely destroying all nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament should therefore be an essential, integral part of the disarmament programme.

With this in mind the Soviet Government has been suggesting, in the course of negotiations on disarmament over a number of years, that a start should be made with the banning of nuclear weapons, the destruction of all nuclear weapon stockpiles and the cessation of nuclear weapon production for ever. If our proposal in this

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

regard, which was first put forward in the days when the atom bomb had only just appeared, had been adopted, the world would now be different and there would be no threat of nuclear extermination.

Unfortunately, however, the Western Powers refused to accept our proposal for banning nuclear weapons. And although the Soviet Union was anxious to start disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapons, it could not disregard the position of the Western Powers and, in particular, the opinion of some of those Powers that nuclear disarmament should start with the destruction of delivery vehicles. In these circumstances, the Soviet Government thought that it might perhaps be easier to reach agreement, if the measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war were divided into two parts, two stages. That is why we proposed that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated in the first stage.

On more than one occasion already, the Soviet delegation has provided a detailed explanation and commentary on the Soviet Government's proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. At several of the Committee's meetings it has been demonstrated that this measure really ensures the practical elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, and at the same time it is an entirely feasible and realistic measure.

The second part of the nuclear disarmament measures -- the banning and elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves -- will, according to our draft treaty, be carried out in the second stage of general and complete disarmament. This means that it is proposed to start the elimination of nuclear bombs, warheads, missiles and projectiles immediately after the elimination of delivery vehicles has been completed, -- that is 24 months after the entry into force of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is proposed that the practical elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out in the course of fifteen months, which, in accordance with Article 28, is the duration of the second stage.

What is the basic content of the disarmament measures which, according to our draft treaty, it is proposed to carry out in the second stage of general and complete disarmament? In this connexion, permit me to remind you of the main provisions of Article 22 of our draft treaty which deals with these measures.

The first provision of Article 22 is that nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities should be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

stored in various depots, should be appropriately processed to render them unfit for the direct re-establishment of weapons. All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons should also be processed in the same way. All nuclear materials, whether extracted from nuclear weapons or not as yet used for the manufacture of these weapons, should after processing form a special fund for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons should be fully destroyed.

Article 22 of the Soviet draft also gives details of measures to ensure the complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons for their components should be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons should be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

And, finally, Article 22 envisages that each State party to the treaty should, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, enact legislation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempt at its re-establishment by individuals or organizations.

The Soviet Government proposes that all these measures should be carried out under strict international control. Under Article 22 of our draft treaty, inspectors of the international disarmament organization would have to exercise control both over the destruction of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armed forces of States, and over the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. The international disarmament organization would have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy. The States parties to the treaty would make available to the organization documents pertaining to the extraction of raw materials, to their processing and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

These are simple and clear proposals. Indeed, in such a matter as the elimination of nuclear weapons, for which the peoples of the entire world are appealing so insistently, there cannot and should not be any place for subterfuge or political manoeuvres.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

More than two years have now passed since the Soviet Government put forward its programme for nuclear disarmament during the first two stages of general and complete disarmament. This programme has attracted world attention. It has been discussed at many sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and more recently at meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

The Soviet Government will, as always, study with the necessary care and attention, and without any bias, all the remarks and considerations which are put forward in connexion with our programme for eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

We have drawn attention to the fact that here in the Committee, and outside the Committee as well, it is being urged with ever greater insistence that, if possible, measures aimed at solving this central problem of disarmament should not be divided into two stages. With this in mind, and guided by its invariable desire to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war from the life of human society as quickly and reliably as possible, the Soviet Government announces its willingness -- if the Western Powers agree -- to transfer all measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and cessation of production, from the second stage to the first.

Do the Western Powers agree to this? Do they intend, in this key question, to meet the most cherished desires and hopes of the peoples? In the further development of the entire history of human society very much will depend on the way in which the Western Powers, and particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, answer this question.

In this connexion we must say that the United States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30, Corr.1, Add.1 and 2) does not, unfortunately, provide any evidence that the Western Powers are prepared radically to settle the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the first stage, or even in the course of disarmament at all. The more closely one examines the United States outline, the more one becomes convinced of this.

It is true that one of the ultimate objectives proclaimed in the introductory section of the United States document is the

"elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons" (ENDC/30, p. 2).

But even in this wording which does nevertheless speak about the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, a very essential and important element is missing,

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

namely the banning of nuclear weapons. The course of the negotiations in the Committee has shown that there is no question here of words being accidentally forgotten. No, it is a much more serious matter than that. It is well known that the United States delegation, in agreeing the contents of article I of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, categorically refused to include in this article a provision banning nuclear weapons. Thus, the words "the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction" still appear in brackets in the working draft of article I submitted to the Committee by the co-Chairmen. Is it not obvious that in this case the United States side has put in brackets a measure which enjoys the general support of the peoples, a measure without which one cannot imagine a solution to the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons?

In justifying his refusal to ban nuclear weapons, the United States representative requested the Committee to study the question of equipping with weapons of this type the international armed force which is to be established as soon as general and complete disarmament is achieved. But can anyone dispute the obvious fact that if nuclear weapons -- which are the most deadly weapons of mass destruction -- were handed over to an international armed force, this would destroy the whole sense of a treaty on general and complete disarmament? I ask you, gentlemen, what kind of disarmament would that be, if the peoples were doomed to go on living in the fear that nuclear weapons might be used.

But that, it seems, is what the Western Powers want. It is no accident that at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the United States and nearly all their allies in the NATO military bloc voted against the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and to brand nuclear warfare as a crime against mankind and against civilization.

Some may say that, though the Western Powers refuse to go so far as banning nuclear weapons, they do agree to the elimination of accumulated stockpiles of these weapons, since there is a reference to this in the aforementioned United States outline. In this connexion we are obliged to recall that, although in the introductory section of the United States outline the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons is indeed declared to be one of the objectives, nevertheless the whole content of this document not only fails to corroborate this declaration, but suggests the exact contrary.

What makes this evident? It is evident first and foremost from the fact that in the United States outline there is no specific provision in the form of an

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

obligation in regard to the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This is referred to merely as one of the objectives, but the way to achieve it is not indicated.

Moreover, the United States outline envisages that before the entry into force of the treaty on general and complete disarmament the question of destroying nuclear weapon stockpiles would not be settled at all. According to the United States outline it would be merely examined by experts in the first stage and its settlement afterwards would depend on the results of this study. In other words, it would depend on the conclusions of the experts who, according to the United States outline, would do their work in the first stage, whether States would have to destroy nuclear weapon stockpiles in the subsequent stages or not.

But what would happen if by the end of the first stage the experts failed to reach a unanimous opinion? We are bound to conclude that the question of eliminating nuclear weapon stockpiles in the process of disarmament would then be dropped legitimately from the agenda. The United States representative, Mr. Dean, left no doubts on this score when he stated early on in the work of the Committee that:

"Until the nuclear experts devised means for safely controlling the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles no nation would, consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, permit the reduction of its own stockpiles to lower levels--to say nothing of the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons in its stockpiles". (ENDC/PV.11, pp. 12 and 13).

Moreover, Mr. Dean stressed that until the studies of the experts have led to a solution of the question of how verification of the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles can be carried out, the United States:

"... cannot conclude an agreement unconditionally providing for the elimination of nuclear weapons". (ibid. p.11)

Thus it turns out that under the United States outline there would not only be no prohibition of nuclear weapons but even the elimination of stockpiles would hardly be likely ever to become a fact. Experience in the negotiations on such a comparatively simple question as the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has shown convincingly how the Western Powers are using various kinds of "technical" and "scientific" questions, conclusions and findings of experts in order to frustrate an agreement.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

It is quite obvious that the United States is bent on doing everything in order to keep nuclear weapons at its disposal and perhaps even to continue improving them. Is this not the reason why the United States is persistently striving to retain for itself in all circumstances the possibility of carrying out experimental nuclear explosions, at any rate underground?

With regard to the first stage, the United States proposals contain no effective measures of nuclear disarmament whatsoever.

What does the United States outline propose for the first stage? Virtually nothing at all, apart from cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. But how many times have we already had to say that this measure cannot even by the greatest stretch of the imagination be assessed as a step towards eliminating nuclear weapons or towards diminishing the threat of a nuclear war. Even after its implementation, States would retain intact immense stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials already produced for military purposes, from which they would be able to create more and more nuclear bombs and missiles. What would be changed in comparison with the present situation? From the point of view of the elimination of nuclear weapons, nothing whatever.

Why, then, is this proposal being put forward? Why does the United States defend it so persistently? There is no secret about the reason. It is well known that the United States links the implementation of this proposal with the establishment of extensive control virtually over the entire atomic industry of States parties to the disarmament treaty. While leaving nuclear weapons intact, the United States wants neither more nor less than to place under control uranium mines, plants processing uranium and thorium ores, diffusion plants for the separation of uranium isotopes, nuclear reactors and all other relevant installations.

Control of this kind, in the circumstances where the nuclear weapons themselves would be retained and, moreover, where States would retain 70 per cent of the means of delivery of these weapons -- as is proposed in the United States outline -- would be a very serious threat to the security of peace-loving States. In that case a potential aggressor would secure favourable, indeed unlimited, opportunities for discovering both the location of the nuclear plants of the other side and their production capacities and would be able to calculate how much fissionable material the other side had accumulated and, consequently, the number of nuclear weapons it may have at its disposal. Why is this needed? It is needed in order to ascertain

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

the targets of the nuclear strikes that are being planned, to gain a better knowledge of the real balance of forces and to find out, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, has said about these plans:

"... whether the balance of forces has changed as a result of the cut in armaments, and whether it is not possible to take advantage of a change to launch an attack". (ENDC/47, p. 13)

In the light of all this it becomes clear that the United States proposal for halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes in the first stage is a measure of control without disarmament in its purest form. In other words, it would be a sheer godsend for the intelligence agencies of the NATO countries.

The Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the establishment of control over the atomic industry, not in the conditions where the arms race would continue, but in the conditions where nuclear weapons would be banned and completely eliminated. It is, of course, impossible for us to agree to control over the atomic industry without nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the United States, without exposing the security of our country to serious danger.

In addition to cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the United States outline provides in the first stage that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The United States representative, at one of the meetings of the Committee, proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States should transfer up to 50 tons of U-235 to peaceful purposes.

Can we consider that to be a measure of nuclear disarmament? No, because such a measure would not diminish the threat of a nuclear war. After such a transfer the nuclear Powers would still have at their disposal more than enough nuclear weapons for carrying out any military operations, including those of the most devastating kind. Today the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, quoted some figures in this regard which fully confirm what we have said (ENDC/PV.80, p. 41). Would life become easier for the inhabitants of the world if the amount of explosives retained worked out for each of them, not at 80 tons -- the figure mentioned by the representative of Mexico today -- but, let us say, at 70 or even 60 tons? Of course it would not become any easier.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

As the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, quite rightly said on 18 March 1962:

"The problem of disarmament today is not so much a question, therefore, of the reduction of armaments by 10, 15, 20 or 25 per cent; if the danger continues to exist, then it makes no difference how much armaments are cut since war, as we know from factual data, is not contingent on there being thousands of thermonuclear bombs in the possession of the nuclear Powers. A quarter of that quantity of bombs would suffice to destroy the whole world or wipe out another country".

This comment helps to place in proper perspective the United States proposal to transfer a certain quantity of fissionable materials for peaceful uses. In the interests of the whole of mankind, in the interests of all the peoples of the world, it is necessary to destroy completely all nuclear bombs, missiles and warheads. Otherwise it will be impossible to prevent a nuclear war.

Facts show, therefore, that it is impossible to solve the problem of nuclear disarmament on the basis of the United States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World". The basis for a radical and constructive solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament is provided by the proposals of the Soviet Union.

Now I should like to reply briefly to Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber in connexion with the statements they made today (*ibid*, pp.5 *et seq.*, and 44 *et seq.*). In their interventions today Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean confirmed once again that the Western Powers do not want businesslike negotiations on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests on a realistic basis, taking into account the constructive considerations which have been put forward by a number of delegations in the course of the discussions on this question in the Eighteen Nation Committee and in the three-Power Sub-Committee.

The representatives of the Western Powers, as in the past, refuse to pay any heed to the facts which have been adduced in the Committee, and which have also appeared and continue to appear in the Press, showing beyond dispute that the state of present-day science enables us to detect any nuclear weapon explosions without any particular difficulty by means of national systems of control.

An agreement to ban all nuclear tests would long ago have been concluded if the Western Powers had shown in the negotiations even a fraction of the goodwill which the Soviet Union is showing. The attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom has been and continues to be that of frustrating an agreement which would put an end to all nuclear weapon tests. This policy is aimed at keeping for the Western Powers

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

a loophole for the continuation of experimental explosions in order to improve existing types of nuclear weapons and develop newer and more destructive models.

How else can one explain the fact that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are stubbornly trying to impose such conditions for the cessation of experimental explosions as would give the general staffs of the Western Powers the opportunity, under the cover of control over an agreement, to carry out intelligence work on the territories of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States? That was the aim pursued by the proposal of the Western Powers of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9); the same demand constitutes the basis of the draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August (ENDC/58).

At the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament on 3 September (ENDC/PV.79, pp.28 et s.), the Soviet delegation examined the substance of this proposal paragraph by paragraph, article by article, and showed that this draft treaty is wholly inspired by the desire to impose an unjustifiably extensive network of control and obligatory on-site inspection. Moreover, these demands are put forward as the indispensable conditions for any negotiations. Such ultimatum-like declarations certainly do not indicate that the Western Powers wish to solve the problem of banning experimental detonations.

The representatives of the United States and the United States and the United Kingdom know full well that it is impossible to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments, which was submitted on 27 August.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I should like to stress once again that this draft treaty cannot serve as a basis for working out an agreement. The discussions in the Committee have shown convincingly that the great majority of delegations take the view that the nuclear Powers should cease nuclear weapon tests in all environments, including underground tests. We too take that stand.

However, the Soviet Union is bound to take into consideration the fact that the Western Powers are not prepared at the present time to sign a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of all tests with the use of national detection systems for the purposes of control. On our part we are sincerely striving to make the most of any opportunities and proposals which would lead to the solution of the problem of putting an end to nuclear weapon tests as a whole.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Although the Soviet Union considers, as in the past, that there exist all the necessary conditions for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments with the use of national detection systems for the purposes of control, however, in order to move forward from the standstill, we are prepared to conclude an agreement which would provide for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. At the same time we must realize that the peoples of the world are expecting the cessation of all tests of any kind and will fail to understand us if underground tests continue.

Cogent arguments have been put forward in the Committee to the effect that the continuation of underground tests would have far-reaching negative consequences. It is clear that with the widening of the circle of nuclear Powers it would become more and more difficult to solve the problem of banning nuclear weapons and the testing of them.

A way out of the existing situation might be the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, while a simultaneous agreement would be reached to put an end also to underground nuclear explosions and to continue negotiations for the purpose of concluding an appropriate agreement banning such explosions. While the negotiations were going on, the States would refrain from conducting any underground nuclear tests and would assume definite obligations in this respect.

In this connexion I should like to stress once again that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, together with a simultaneous agreement by States not to conduct underground nuclear explosions during the negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement which would also cover this type of nuclear tests, would not place any country in a position of advantage nor would it create a threat to anyone. This is a realistic approach to the solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which could be achieved in the present conditions and which would correspond to the interests of all the peoples.

I should like to say a few words regarding an observation which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom keep on making at one meeting after another in trying to justify their refusal to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. They have again put forward their unfounded account of how the Soviet Union allegedly violated some sort of agreement on some sort of moratorium in regard to nuclear weapon tests and that this makes it necessary for the Western Powers to insist on establishing obligatory international inspection for control over underground nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I shall not repeat in detail the arguments which have been put forward by the Soviet delegation time after time on this score. I shall limit myself to the following: are the United States and United Kingdom representatives unaware that there could be no question of any violation of an agreement on a moratorium for the simple reason that no such international agreement existed?

At yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Dean agreed that this was so (ENDC/SC.1/PV.25 p. 19). Yet today he again raises the very same question (ENDC/PV.80, p. 51).

I will remind you of a few facts in this connexion. In March 1958 when the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it would not carry out nuclear explosions, the Western Powers replied with a series of nuclear tests of unprecedented intensity. At the end of 1959 the former President Eisenhower announced that the United States considered itself no longer bound in any way in regard to carrying out nuclear explosions and would carry them out when it deemed it necessary to do so.

While the negotiations at Geneva for the preparation of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests were going on, an ally of the United Kingdom and the United States -- France -- continued to carry out nuclear explosions one after the other. Mr. Dean is coyly silent about the fact that the United States is continuing nuclear explosions at the present time and, moreover, has switched the nuclear arms race into outer space. It was not the Soviet Union that was responsible for starting nuclear explosions, nor is it responsible for their continuation. On each occasion it was merely by way of reply that the Soviet Union was compelled to make its own arrangements with a view to ensuring its security. Therefore, the representatives of the Western Powers are trying in vain to find a justification for refusing to conduct negotiations for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on a realistic basis.

I shall now conclude. If the United States and the United Kingdom desire, in deed and not in words, to ban all nuclear weapon tests, they cannot object to such an approach to the solution of this problem. If so we could easily move forward and quickly work out an appropriate agreement.

As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it is prepared to go on trying to reach an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposals of 28 November 1961 or on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. Thus, it is up to the Western Powers to speak.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I understand that the representative of the United States has requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply. According to our usual procedure, the right of reply is exercised after the list of speakers has been exhausted. Therefore, I would ask the representative of the United States if he would be willing to speak after the other speakers have made their statements, or whether he wishes to speak now.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I would prefer to speak now, but I shall try to be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): If there is no objection on the part of the other speakers or of the Committee, I shall call now on the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In view of the very constructive tone of our discussions in attempting to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament and a treaty to ban nuclear tests in all environments, I can only express the sincere regret of my Government at the note that the representative of the Soviet Union has introduced into our meeting this afternoon, just before we rise for our recess. In connexion with the first part of Mr. Kuznetsov's statement, I should like to call the attention of the Committee to the text of the immediate reply by the United States to the Soviet Government's note alleging the U-2 flight over Soviet territory on 30 August. The reply of the United States reads as follows:

"The charge contained in the Soviet note of Sept. 4 that a U.S. aircraft violated Soviet air space Aug. 30 and overflowed Soviet territory and territorial waters was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note.

"Investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may in fact have taken place. A patrol craft operated by the U.S. Air Force was in the Northern Pacific area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encountered severe winds during this nighttime flight and may therefore have overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin.

"My Government has instructed me to state that the policy of the U.S. Government with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains as stated by the President on Jan. 25, 1961.

"If the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory, this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions.

"Precautions intended to prevent such incidents are under review." I submit that that note clearly indicates that the United States Government has not a war policy and that it is not planning any pre-emptive attacks, nuclear or otherwise, on the Soviet people.

Let me turn now to another question. It appears from the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union today that the Soviet Government intends to accept the proposal made by the United States and the United Kingdom at our plenary meeting on 31 August to continue negotiations, preferably in Geneva, for a nuclear test ban during the recess of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. However, the Soviet delegation appears to have attached a condition to its acceptance, a condition stipulating that negotiations can proceed only if the United States and the United Kingdom accept either the eight Power memorandum (ENDC/28) or the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) as the exclusive basis for continued negotiations.

I should like to emphasize that the joint proposal of the United Kingdom and the United States was put forward without any conditions whatsoever. Our only objective is to reach agreement as soon as possible on an effective treaty to ban nuclear tests. We have laid before the Conference, it is true, in an effort to speed up our work and to be constructive, two draft treaties, a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments (ENDC/58) and a partial treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water (ENDC/59).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I should like to point out that the comprehensive test ban treaty (ENDC/58) which the United Kingdom and the United States presented to this Conference at our seventy-fifth plenary meeting on Monday last, 27 August, was drafted so as to incorporate many features of the eight nation memorandum. I am sure that a careful study of this draft treaty will show the large extent to which the eight nation memorandum has indeed been used to solve the problems of arriving at an effective treaty banning all nuclear tests.

The problem of negotiating a limited or a partial test ban treaty, however, is not concerned with the question of agreeing on international controls. In our proposed draft the use of existing systems of control is in apparent accord with the Soviet position. The eight nation memorandum, which is concerned with the question of international control, is therefore not designed to serve as a basis for this type of partial agreement on banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

The joint proposal of the United Kingdom and the United States to continue negotiating for a test ban treaty during the recess was put forward, as I have said, without any conditions attached. We had expected that it would be accepted in the same manner as that in which it was put forward, but apparently the Soviet Union now desires to attach a set of conditions to its acceptance of the proposal. We are prepared, as we have proposed, to continue the Sub-Committee talks, preferably in Geneva, but we do not accept the Soviet statement as meaning that any conditions are attached with regard to how our work should proceed.

Let me now turn to another subject. We would of course wish to study the Soviet modification of its position on eliminating nuclear weapons in the field of general and complete disarmament in order to determine whether it offers some possibilities of reconciling present differences. From what I hear today it appears that certain of those proposals are proposals that the Soviet Government knows to have been opposed by my Government because they would cause a serious and immediate imbalance in the present military situation and because they raise the gravest difficulties of control, which the Soviet Union refuses even to discuss.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As the Committee knows, the United States has long held the view that one of the most urgent tasks that we face is that of halting the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. We believe any first stage of disarmament should include, in addition to a ban on nuclear weapon tests, which we hope will already have come into being, a halt in the production of fissionable material for use in weapons and the transfer of agreed quantities of U 235 from past production to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. It would be important also to prevent the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to individual States which do not own them, but the transfer to multinational institutions constitutes a somewhat different problem. We have urged that some of these measures might be considered even before a general disarmament programme has been agreed upon.

Our proposals for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials would of course require adequate control measures but, since such controls would not extend to factories transforming fissionable materials into weapons, the controls would be limited to the relatively few plants in each country which turn out such materials. This is far from the Soviet representative's picture of putting the whole atomic industry under first stage controls. As for our proposal to transfer some fissionable materials to peaceful uses, let me say very clearly that if the Soviet representative thinks the 50,000 kilograms the United States has proposed is insufficient to cut into existing stocks, then I urge that the Soviet Union propose any other quantity that it considers suitable and we will give it very serious consideration.

In sum, I would say that if the new proposals of the Soviet Government reflect the desire to contain and reduce the nuclear arms race at an early time, then indeed they are to be welcomed. I would have to add, of course, that the Soviet Government has in the past shifted general disarmament obligations in one area or another from one stage to another, but that has not enabled us to engage in meaningful discussions. Why is that so? It is so because the United States has not been able to induce the Soviet delegation to engage in discussion on detailed specific obligations. The Soviet delegation loves to indulge in those circus propaganda stunts. But I submit in all seriousness that we are here to discuss in depth a plan to accomplish general and complete disarmament, and not merely to advertise our intentions in a circus manner.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Thus, for example, in 1959 the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear disarmament measures should not take place until stage III. In 1960 it proposed that they should take place in stage II, and now we have a Soviet proposal that some measure of nuclear disarmament should begin in stage I but that there should be no verification or inspection until general and complete disarmament has been completed. We will not be able to determine whether this latest shifting of generalities has any meaning until we sit down together and seek to translate those generalities into specific terms for nuclear disarmament. I am very much afraid, however, that for the moment the Soviet proposal, as I have said, appears to be more of a circus propaganda manoeuvre than a serious attempt at disarmament negotiations.

If members of the Committee will read our draft treaty outline (ENDC/30) they will see that it specifically provides for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons by the end of stage III. All that need be done to see those provisions is to look at our text. The United States outline proposes in paragraph C.6. that during stage I:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles."  
(ENDC/30. p. 10)

As I have said in this Conference, I would hope that an international nuclear expert study could be commenced during these negotiations and that there would be no remaining questions by the time stage I was commenced. If so we could agree to further effective means for dealing with nuclear weapon stockpiles for stage I. However, if that examination cannot be conducted until stage I starts, we will certainly delay our progress in accomplishing the goal we all seek -- the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles now in the hands of four nations. Our draft proposed a reduction of such stockpiles to minimum levels in stage II, and their complete elimination in stage III in the light of the steps taken earlier.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the Conference, for permitting me to make this reply at this time.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I too am compelled to make a slight departure from the adopted procedure, but I should like -- also by way of exception -- to be given the opportunity to answer Mr. Dean straight away and not at the end of the meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I also have a request from the United Kingdom delegation to reply to the speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union, and if Mr. Kuznetsov and the Committee have no objections I will first call on the representative of the United Kingdom in exercise of his right of reply, and then on the representative of the Soviet Union.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Committee.

I was happy to hear from Mr. Kuznetsov that the Soviet Government agrees to the Western suggestion that the nuclear test Sub-Committee should continue to work during the recess. As Mr. Godber has already said, the United Kingdom associates itself fully with the statement made by President Kennedy that the United States would like to see a nuclear test ban treaty signed by 1 November and coming into force on 1 January. The United Kingdom endorses and supports that aim. For our part, I pledge the wholehearted effort of the United Kingdom Government to reach an agreement.

At the same time, I did not wholly understand some remarks which I thought I heard Mr. Kuznetsov make to the effect that the Soviet Government wished to impose upon its partners in the negotiations some one-sided and arbitrary limitation or restriction on what they might say in the course of continued negotiations. If Mr. Kuznetsov was really trying to impose some sort of unilateral ukase or diktat on the proceedings of the Sub-Committee -- and I cannot believe that he really was -- I must tell him, in a friendly but firm manner, that he is, as we say in my country, posting a letter to the wrong address. Naturally, Mr. Kuznetsov is free to say what he wishes in the Sub-Committee. I would not dream of questioning his right or the right of his delegation to say or propose whatever they want either in the plenary Committee or in the Sub-Committee, or in any other forum. Of course I would not dream of questioning that.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

Equally, I could not of course accept the right of the Soviet Government to question the right of my delegation to say whatever we wish or to make any proposal we wish. It would be an unheard-of procedure to seek to dictate to another delegation what proposals it should or should not make. For our part, we will work for an agreement in full freedom to contribute in whatever way seems to us most constructive to the search for an effective nuclear test ban. If, however, Mr. Kuznetsov meant that the Soviet Government wishes to place a restriction on the freedom of negotiation of its own delegation that is, of course, another matter. It would be most regrettable if the Soviet representatives were to hope to negotiate an agreement with their hands tied behind their backs; it would not be a good omen for agreement. But I cannot believe that that is really the intention.

What I welcome is the willingness to continue discussion. If in fact the Soviet delegation comes to the discussions with any preconceived reservations I hope, and I say this in the most friendly way, that we may be able to convince it -- in the same constructive spirit which led us to put forward our two latest proposals -- that there are better ways to negotiate an agreement.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and apologise to the Committee for having to take up its time once more. However, my delegation considers that the questions are important, and therefore it is necessary to make things clear in connexion with the explanations given by Mr. Dean.

As regards the reply of the United States Government, we take note of it. In this connexion I should like to stress that the Soviet Union considers it to be one of the most important aims of its foreign policy to contribute in every way to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, taking into account that on the state of these relations largely depends the direction in which the development of the international situation will go: in the direction of peace or war. But such a great and responsible aim cannot be achieved by one side alone. It is necessary that the other side also should show the same sincere desire to improve relations and to remove from this path all the obstacles which have been piled up through no fault of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

In this connexion I should like to ask Mr. Dean what the United States Government hopes to achieve by incessantly sending its reconnaissance aircraft to the frontiers of the Soviet Union? Does it really think that it is possible in that way to help towards improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? Does it really think that it is possible in that way to strengthen mutual confidence and reduce international tension? It is obvious to everyone that such actions can only complicate the situation, make it more tense, and render more difficult the creation of an atmosphere of confidence which is necessary for a mutually acceptable solution of the main international issues.

We sincerely desire that the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States should not be clouded by such incidents occasioned by the United States side and we shall be very glad if there are no such provocations on the part of the United States.

Now a few words about the intentions with which each delegation of the nuclear Powers attends the meetings of the Sub-Committee. I cannot but express great surprise at the comments made by Mr. Dean. He tried to make out that the delegation of the United States had proposed continuing the work of the Sub-Committee but had said nothing on its part about the intentions or the baggage with which the United States delegation would attend the meetings of the Sub-Committee. Mr. Dean, it seems, decided to lead the Committee astray, because in the verbatim records of our meetings we find just the opposite. In this connexion I should like to quote an extract from Mr. Dean's statement on 31 August. In putting forward his proposal that the Sub-Committee should not interrupt its work, Mr. Dean said:

"... my Government, after consultation with the United Kingdom, formally proposes to the Conference that our Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue to meet during the recess period. My Government believes that, by keeping the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban in session, and with maximum pressure on the Sub-Committee to reach agreement, it should be possible to complete our task of reaching agreement on the text of a treaty by 1 November of

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

this year so that it could become effective not later than 1 January 1963. We intend to continue the negotiations on the basis of the two draft treaties which were tabled by the United States and the United Kingdom". (ENDC/PV.77, p.38)

Dealing with the same question at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 4 September 1962 Mr. Dean said:

"We are very willing to negotiate with our Soviet colleagues on the basis of our two draft treaties, both the comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58) and the partial draft treaty (ENDC/59)." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.25, p.21)

The Soviet delegation expressed its agreement to continue the work of the Sub-Committee without interruption and at the same time it stated its opinion regarding the basis which it considers should be adopted for the preparation of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. Why, then, do you wish to make here a discrimination against the Soviet Union, Mr. Dean? Why does the United States delegation consider that it can do whatever it likes, but if another delegation expresses its opinion and the United States does not agree with it, then it is doing something that is not allowed? Who in this case is presenting an ultimatum regarding the conditions on which we are to negotiate? I do not think I need say any more on this question.

I should like to make the following remark in connexion with what Mr. Dean said regarding the views put forward by the Soviet delegation concerning our attitude to nuclear disarmament.

First of all I must say that the tone which Mr. Dean used, a tone which should certainly not be used in the Eighteen Nation Committee, can hardly serve the purpose of clarifying the positions or help towards a better mutual understanding. Now for the substance. Mr. Dean tried to prove that the Soviet Union put forward such proposals when nuclear disarmament measures were not envisaged in the first stage. I shall not go into the history of this question now, because the Soviet delegation intends in the course of the discussions on this matter to show in detail that throughout the negotiations the Soviet Union has consistently and steadfastly been in favour of banning nuclear weapons, ceasing their production and eliminating all stockpiles of them. I should merely like to refer to a document relating to 19 June 1946. I would remind you that that was the time

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

when the first consultations took place between international bodies in the United Nations on measures that would have to be taken so that the danger of a nuclear war would no longer hang over mankind.

What did the Soviet Union propose then -- and I stress -- on 19 June 1946? Then the Soviet Union submitted a document, entitled "Draft International Convention to Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction". Article 1 of this draft read:

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and the employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations; (a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstance whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; (c) to destroy within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the present Convention all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition." (AEC/7, 24 June 1946).

The United States refused to accept this proposal and you know what that has now led to. In any case, it is not the Soviet Union that is responsible for the nuclear arms race assuming such a wide scope. We are still in favour of banning nuclear weapons altogether, ceasing their production and eliminating all stockpiles of them. If the United States agrees with this, we can very quickly prepare an appropriate agreement. This would be in the interests of all mankind and in the interests of delivering all human beings from the threat of a devastating thermonuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): The United States representative has asked for the floor. The Committee is the master of its own procedure, and I would just consult the members of the Committee. Do they want to conclude this debate, or do they want to proceed further with the list of speakers?

Mr. TAKABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I do not think we should start a fresh debate with only the great Powers taking part. Admittedly, we have come here to listen to them, but other Powers, I think, have also come here to express their opinions.

I am particularly anxious that the debate should not now take a tone like that of Mr. Dean's speech a moment ago.

Mr. Dean is certainly one of the most respected members of this Conference; but I think there ought to be some moderation in the language we use here.

Perhaps Mr. Dean was feeling a bit offended, but in a prepared statement one should not compare our Conference to a circus. For to compare, as Mr. Dean did, things done here to what you see at a circus is to say that here we are in a circus. I do not think that is the kind of tone we should give to our debates.

In the second place, I suggest that the Conference should follow the rule which it has laid down, under which, except in the case of a question relating to the agenda, the right to reply should be exercised only at the end of a meeting or at the beginning of the following meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): Are there any further comments? In view of the objection on the part of the representative of Bulgaria, could we postpone further comments until after we have listened to the representatives whose names are already inscribed on the list of speakers?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am quite happy to abide by your ruling, Mr. Chairman. Apparently there has been a misunderstanding between the Soviet representative and me which I think I could clear up if you could give me thirty seconds.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): If there are no objections, I shall give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): If representatives will refer to the page 38 of the verbatim record of the plenary meeting held on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) they will find that it is quite clear that we put forward our

(Mr. Dean, United States)

proposal to continue the negotiations in the Sub-Committee without any conditions. At least that is the way it appears in the English version. On the next page there is a statement of our intent, but it is in no sense a condition. Also, reference to pages 21-22 of the verbatim record of the meeting of the Sub-Committee held on 4 September (ENDC/SC.I/PV.25) will show again that we put that proposal forward without any conditions.

As I understand it now, the Soviet representative feels that he should be free to advance anything that he pleases in discussions in the Sub-Committee and in our continued negotiations during the recess. I quite agree. So from our discussion I take it we are agreed that the Sub-Committee should continue to meet -- I hope here in Geneva -- with each delegation completely free to negotiate on whatever basis it believes will be fruitful. I hope that will settle whatever differences there are between my Soviet colleague and me.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): In view of the approaching recess, this seems the right moment to attempt to answer the following questions: Has the Conference come any nearer, and how far, to the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations? What results can the peoples legitimately expect from the work of our Conference?

There is obviously one fact which, in itself alone, has a positive significance, and that is that a representative body where representatives of socialist, Western and neutral countries sit down together is discussing a specific draft treaty on disarmament and that its discussions are based on the agreed necessity of achieving general and complete disarmament as the only way of freeing mankind from the threat of war.

This fact, however, should not dull our critical spirit or the concern we feel at the absence of substantial results in drawing up an agreed programme of disarmament.

The criterion for the effectiveness of a disarmament programme is that it should be timed and phased so that at each stage a new situation would be created and irreversible steps taken, making a return to the armaments race impossible.

Ever since the beginning of the Geneva Conference, two conceptions of disarmament have been discernible.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

One of them, expressed in the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist States, provides for effective disarmament measures at the different stages of disarmament. Under this conception, the implementation of the very first stage will free the peoples of the greatest threat hanging over the world today, the danger of the outbreak of a war with nuclear weapons. Today the arsenals of the Powers contain means which exceed many times the needs of a potential aggressor who wishes to carry out a surprise attack. One cannot therefore expect to advance and prepare the way for subsequent steps of disarmament if States realize that, after a partial reduction in certain weapons, the other party will still possess a machine capable of striking a blow and ready at any moment to do so. Such a reduction of armaments would not create an atmosphere of confidence; it would provide no incentive for continuing the implementation of the disarmament process.

For this reason we support the Soviet proposal for the complete abolition in the first stage of disarmament of nuclear weapon vehicles with a parallel 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons, the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of third states. These are measures which go to the root of the disarmament problem.

In its statement just now, the Soviet Union declared itself ready to begin the disarmament process by the abolition of the nuclear weapon itself. Can this new gesture of goodwill, meant to facilitate agreement, seriously be described as a propaganda move or presented as a trick? I must stage with regret that such a reaction, and the language in which it is couched, cannot help us in our work.

Unlike the Soviet plan, the United States plan does not attack the main source of the danger which results from the present state of the armaments race. Instead of effective measures of disarmament, it suggests half measures which do not remove the threat of a nuclear attack but preserve it until the very end of the long-term disarmament process, whose date cannot be foreseen. This implies a permanent state of danger and favours those forces which continue to hatch mad schemes for armed conflict with the socialist countries. Though it must be admitted that in the Western world, the realization of the absurdity and folly of war at the present time is continually gaining ground, there are still numerous and influential political forces who have not renounced the notion of a policy of force.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

A new example of the recrudescence of the activity of these forces was condemned here today by Mr. Kuznetsov, the Soviet representative, when he spoke of the irresponsible violation of the Soviet Union's air space by an American U-2 aircraft.

I should also like to remind you that I represent a country whose security and vital interests are threatened by the policy into which certain political circles are seeking to draw the Federal Republic of Germany. These circles do not hide their desire to involve the rapidly growing military forces of that country and its allies in their expansionist plans directed, amongst others, against Poland.

Only yesterday the German revanchists, wishing apparently to add to the brilliance of General de Gaulle's visit to the German Federal Republic, demonstrated with provocative slogans demanding the return to Germany of Gdansk and Silesia -- evidently with the benevolent connivance of the Bonn authorities.

This is another example of the so-called peaceful policy of that country.

The United States plan proposes to maintain the existing armament structure of the Powers throughout the whole process of disarmament. There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that the Soviet proposals which provide, in the first stage, for radical measures to eliminate the possibility of large scale military action, should meet with the disapproval of the United States representative.

On this point, Mr. Dean at the meeting of 3 September, revealed what it is that keeps American statesmen awake at night. In Mr. Dean's words they are afraid of:

"... a radical readjustment both of the military positions of States and of the military inter-relationships of States; to eliminate the military presence of the United States from Europe; to fragment the Western European countries into a number of small, separate armed forces which would be prohibited from any military co-operation with one another ...." (ENDC/PV.79, p.6)

What is more, as he said:

"The United States, under the Soviet plan, would become an immobile prisoner within its own borders on the North American continent ...."  
(ibid. p.7).

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

Here we have in black and white the essential meaning of the Western alliances as interpreted by a most competent authority. As we see, the cement which binds these alliances together is the armaments race. It would be appropriate to ask if the countries of western Europe -- great and small -- cannot exist and develop apart from engaging in an armaments race.

Does disarmament threaten co-operation -- peaceful, naturally -- between the United States and western Europe? Does disarmament mean for the United States imprisonment within its own borders?

To leave in existence, as the United States plan proposes, 70 per cent of the potential of nuclear weapon vehicles, 70 per cent of conventional weapons, 100 per cent of nuclear weapons, not to mention military bases and forces stationed in foreign countries, is to make no substantial change in the present situation and to confirm the existing threat to peace constituted by the nuclear armaments race. The United States plan means the extension throughout the disarmament period of the situation described in the West as "the balance of terror" which is based on the threat of using nuclear weapons. We should point out in this connexion that Mr. Dean admitted at the meeting of 3 September that

"... the United States plan does not eliminate the risk of nuclear war in the first stage." (ENDC/PV.79, p.13)

It is significant that he considers this as a virtue in the United States plan.

Although on certain points concerning the reduction of conventional weapons and of their manufacture we have come somewhat closer together, we cannot affirm that these results bring us any nearer to the solution of basic problems. We cannot at present find any hopes on the reduction of conventional weapons, so long as the United States insists on the preservation of means permitting the use of nuclear weapons.

In the same way, as regards the so-called partial measures, the socialist States suggest solutions which, though they do not settle the disarmament problem in general, have a bearing on essential questions whose solution would tend to lessen international tension and so would facilitate general and complete disarmament.

With this in mind the Polish delegation submitted to the Conference the memorandum on the creation of a de-nuclearized zone of limited armaments in

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). This question is on the agenda of our Conference and we are sure that at the proper time the Committee will give it the consideration it deserves, bearing in mind the fact that the establishment of the zone we propose would be a factor for security in a region that is particularly important for the peace of the world.

We should also like to express the hope that a solution will be found to the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to which we -- like most of the delegations here -- attach great importance.

Let me pass now to another question to which the Committee has devoted considerable time during the last few meetings -- the question of banning nuclear tests. Here too we must point out that, although on 27 August the United States and the United Kingdom submitted two alternative drafts, not only have we come no nearer to a solution of the problem but have actually taken a step backward.

You will recall that after a long and difficult period of deadlock in the negotiations, the eight-Power memorandum allowed us to glimpse a possibility of agreement. The Soviet Union accepted the memorandum as a basis of agreement. The United States on the other hand, while employing various phrases to avoid admitting that it rejected it, has now, in its drafts, completely dissociated itself from the eight-Power memorandum.

In what is called the comprehensive draft treaty, proposing the banning of tests in all environments, the authors have returned to their idea of obligatory international on-site inspection which, in the light of scientific knowledge and practical experience, cannot be justified by the needs of identification. The fragments of the eight-Power memorandum which remain in this draft, like for example the name of the control body "international scientific commission", while preserving the character and functions envisaged for it in the earlier United States plan, do not essentially alter the matter. No trace remains in the United States-United Kingdom draft of the idea of the memorandum concerning inspection on invitation by the State in whose territory suspicious tremors have been recorded. And yet it is well known, and has been stressed by the delegations of the countries which submitted the memorandum, that this concept provides the basis for agreement -- especially after the constructive elucidations of the Soviet representative who explained how his country conceives the role of the inviting country.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

The United States and the United Kingdom knew very well that their comprehensive draft treaty could not be accepted. Accordingly they submitted simultaneously a second draft, this time partial, which leaves the countries free to carry out nuclear tests underground. In this way, these countries leave us the choice between the two alternatives: to accept the earlier United States draft or to continue the armaments race by improving nuclear weapons by underground tests.

There is, however, another solution, which does not impose on any of the parties the superfluous and unacceptable system of international obligatory inspection, and which, at the same time, puts an end to all forms of nuclear armaments race. This solution was adumbrated in the eight-Power memorandum and it is only necessary, now that it has been accepted by the Soviet Union, for the United States to accept it also. Equally, it is possible to agree on the question of the discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water while at the same time stopping underground tests for the period of the negotiations on this question until an agreement is reached.

We understand and share the concern of the non-aligned States which demand the ending of nuclear weapon tests. Their concern is ours. And it is precisely this concern which dictates the necessity of stopping all loopholes for improving this weapon, including underground tests. The humanitarian side of the problem consists not only in the danger of the radiations to health, but above all in the growing threat of a catastrophic nuclear war.

The view that it is necessary to stop all nuclear tests is, moreover, shared by the neutral States, as is shown by the statements of the Indian representative and those of other countries.

The reason why the results of our Committee's work fall short of its tasks and of the hopes of the peoples is that the Western Powers have adopted a negative attitude to the proposals of the socialist States, while on their side they have put forward drafts which avoid the essential problems of disarmament and touch only on secondary questions, or else are completely at variance with the aim of preventing an armed conflict with weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

We hope that the results of our work up to now, defining the areas of divergence or proximity of view, will be helpful to the Committee in its future proceedings, and that the United States and the other Western States will see their way to adopting a more constructive attitude on this question of life and death for mankind.

The Polish delegation, for its part, as well as the other socialist delegations, will spare no effort that may help to find a solution of the disarmament problem.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): The representative of the United Arab Republic is leaving Geneva tomorrow and will not attend further meetings. The representatives of Canada and of Italy have kindly agreed to give him the opportunity to speak before them.

Mr. FATTAH HASSAN (United Arab Republic): We are very grateful to the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, and to my esteemed friend, Mr. Cavalletti.

My delegation intends to offer a few comments on the work of our Conference during its second round. In the field of disarmament negotiations the Committee adopted a new method of work, namely in selecting twelve substantive subjects related to the first stage of disarmament for discussion in depth. Although barely a quarter of those subjects was covered during this round, we have gained some valuable insight and a wider understanding of those problems. Furthermore, the two parties' stands have become more clear and unambiguous. Clarifying the issues is the first step towards bridging differences. One point deserves mention in this respect. While discussing some of the subjects in more depth we have not eliminated the differences. That becomes only too well apparent from studying the attempt of the two co-Chairmen to find a common draft language for item 5(a) of document ENDC/52. The existence of so many brackets -- what has aptly been called the "war of brackets" -- decreases or even nullifies the value of attempting at this early stage to find common treaty language. Might it not be possible to proceed with the study in depth of the remaining subjects and relegate the task of drafting to such time as it seems promising or possible? We hope our Committee will be able to record more success in dealing with the remaining subjects.

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Before leaving that point I should like to commend the delegation of the United Kingdom for its efforts in highlighting certain technical problems, which, even though they may not be taken up immediately for study, will still have some value as eye-openers. In fact our Committee should welcome any delegation's initiative in sharing with the other Committee members some of the fruits of its research or thought, although the Committee may not necessarily decide to give them immediate formal discussion. My delegation wants also to record its appreciation of the conciliatory and constructive spirit of both co-Chairmen in agreeing on our new method of work and in presenting document ENDC/52, which has come to constitute our Committee's agenda.

Our deliberations on disarmament during this second round have, by and large, been characterized by a businesslike, constructive approach. Our delegation on 25 July (ENDC/PV.61, p.40) welcomed the constructive spirit of the Soviet Union in bringing about a series of important modifications (ENDC/48), especially in accepting reduction of conventional arms by the same percentage ratio suggested before by the United States. The Soviet Union had every right to be proud of its conciliatory modifications, and it called upon the United States to match this with a similar Western gesture. We are happy to see that that did not take long in materializing. One particular source of gratification to our delegation, and one for which we are thankful to the United States delegation, is that both of the United States sets of amendments of 6 August (ENDC/30/Add.1) and 8 August (ENDC/30/Add.2) were brought about in response to appeals or constructive remarks -- or call them criticisms if you will -- which came from the United Arab Republic delegation among others.

With reference to the question of the relationship of production to reduction of armaments by types within categories, in the United States plan, my delegation asked the following question at our meeting on 21 May:

"Would it be possible for a State under the United States plan to elect to reduce its production of those aeroplanes more rapidly than required by the treaty and be entitled to retain existing missiles and submarine-launched missiles, and even go on producing certain amounts of these missiles within stage I? If so, would not the resulting weapons inventory be somewhat different from the initial declaration made public

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

at the beginning of the process? And would this difference be made known to or receive the prior approval of the other party or the international disarmament organization? And would not some of these shifts result in altering the balance existing at the time of the initial declaration? (ENDC/PV.40, p.17)

As I said before, we are happy to note that under the new United States amendment the above criticism will no longer be necessary.

Again, with reference to the no less important transition provisions, my delegation ventured to suggest:

"United States projects in the past were content to leave to the international disarmament organization the decision as to the satisfactory execution of the measures embodied in one stage, and as to the readiness of the machinery of the next stage to go into operation. If the Soviet Union draft has left this decision to the international disarmament organization and has provided in its project for decisions within the international disarmament organization council to be taken by a two-thirds majority -- making it possible for the Soviet Union, as Mr. Dean said, to block passage of any decision by its one-third of the votes plus one vote or one abstention by a neutral State -- would not the very same position work in favour of the United States as well? Or, if there is no difference in actual practice or in substance between the two projects, as the United States delegation has contended, could not this similarity lead to the acceptance of a joint formula?" (ibid., pp.16, 17)

Therefore, we are gratified to see that the two parties' positions on transition have also drawn closer together, and we hope that this show of practicality and compromise on both sides augurs well for future disarmament talks in the next round.

I am sure that I speak for the majority of our Committee when I voice some disappointment over our Conference's seeming neglect of collateral measures. During the whole second round only one meeting, the meeting of the Committee of the Whole (ENDC/C.I/PV.9) of 19 July, was devoted to them. There is even more reason for disappointment since that meeting on 19 July did point to some

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

possibilities of rapprochement between the two parties' views. We venture to hope, therefore, that collateral measures will be given more attention by our Conference during the next round, since there is agreement also that such initial measures will help to facilitate an accord on disarmament.

On 13 June 1962 my delegation asked this question:

"... could we not think, during our recess, of the possibility of discussing, with a view to implementing, some or all of the collateral measures proposed by East or by West or otherwise, as a package arrangement? The idea behind this tentative thought, which we formulate for what it may be worth, is that each individual measure may complete and sustain the others and satisfy some of the requirements for the successful implementation of the others, sometimes even balancing one another, so that the general picture may be a more stabilized and balanced one than in the case of the implementation of just one individual measure. It may be worthy of mention that such a package arrangement of collateral measures, aside from favouring the preservation of the requisite balance, may easily facilitate future agreement on disarmament and lead to such a treaty. It may also be a useful testing ground for building and verifying possible similar disarmament techniques. In other words, could this package arrangement not serve as a preliminary stage connected with or leading into the disarmament process?" (ENDC/PV.55, p.32)

We were particularly gratified, therefore, when the representative of Sweden, Baron von Platen, supported this idea in his statement of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, p.34). We, for our part, naturally, would welcome any further consideration given to this idea. We hope that our co-Chairmen will have time to give it some thought during the recess, if they see some value in this approach.

Since I spoke last on the question of the cessation of tests, on 15 August (ENDC/PV.70, pp.21 et seq.), some significant developments have taken place. The United States and the United Kingdom have tabled two draft treaties (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59); the United States and the Soviet Union have announced their acceptance of 1 January 1963 as a suitable deadline for stopping all tests provided, of course, that adequate instruments have been agreed upon in the meantime; the

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that the Sub-Committee on the cessation of tests should continue its work during the recess; and the Soviet Union informed the Committee today of its acceptance of that proposal. We feel that that is a constructive and important step coming after both parties have accepted Mr. Padilla Nervo's original and brilliant idea of fixing a date for ending all nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.34, p.16). Today, Mr. Padilla Nervo complimented both parties on their acceptance of this date, and we join our voice with his in asking that the Sub-Committee should give this point priority in its forthcoming discussions. My delegation's intention in returning to the subject of the test ban today is to say that we welcome any effort by any party to bring us nearer to an agreement. In this connexion we welcome the continuation of test ban negotiations during the recess and we wish the Sub-Committee every success in its work.

We would be failing in our duty, however, if we did not take this opportunity to recall our previous suggestion made on 15 August when we asked whether it would not be more profitable for the two co-Chairmen to lay down agreed practical arrangements -- in other words, to agree on the modalities and mechanics of on-site inspection in practical and concrete cases. What we suggest to the co-Chairmen in fact is to replace both parties' insistence on a rigid and immutable principle -- namely, obligatory on-site inspection or on-site inspection by invitation only -- to replace such hypothetical words by an agreement on the mechanics of adequate and practical inspection according to the merits of concrete cases. Mr. Dean, on 9 August, qualified obligatory inspection by the term "if necessary". Mr. Kuznetsov once said that the formula of on-site inspection upon invitation did not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in concrete cases (ENDC/PV.71, p.43). It may therefore be necessary and practical now to turn to the task of trying to define a little more clearly the conditions, mechanical attributes and modalities of inspection in such concrete cases. Among such practical subjects to be reviewed, our co-Chairmen may wish to give effect to Mr. Edberg's proposal (ENDC/PV.77, p.32), supported by Mr. Barrington on 3 September (ENDC/PV.78, p. 8), to discuss the possibility of establishing the international commission envisaged in the joint memorandum, as well as its functions and attributes.

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

And when my delegation speaks of laying down mechanical arrangements for inspection in concrete cases we have mainly in mind the possibilities of securing reliance on the impartial law of probability, or on a sort of an impartial "numbers game" which can be based on the system of reporting by the national observation posts and the evaluation thereof by the international commission according to agreed proceedings. That commission, on whose reliability, objectivity and impartiality the mechanics of inspection could be more easily negotiated, is empowered by the memorandum -- on the basis of its wealth of information and according to agreed mechanical proceedings -- with the right of determining what events could be termed as suspicious and significant and, therefore, as qualifying for the request by the commission for on-site inspection. This is the main thought around which the whole of the joint memorandum revolved, and on the basis of which was envisaged its "system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis" (ENDC/28) -- and I emphasize the word "non-political". As international relations stand nowadays, reliance could be more readily secured on the unimpeachable integrity, impartiality and objectiveness of an international commission, "consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries", (*ibid.*) as Mr. Barrington pointed out in his remarks on 3 September.

For those weighty considerations my delegation would consider that the system envisaged by the memorandum would be impaired if the powers to request on-site inspection were removed from the international commission. My delegation therefore associates itself with Mr. Barrington's appeal both to the co-sponsors of the draft treaty (ENDC/58) and to the Soviet Union in this regard. A compromise formula can surely be found, representing a concession from both parties. It does not have to be identical in meaning or scope with either side's position of principle. Maybe our co-Chairmen can find in practical mechanical arrangements a common formula which they have not found so far in words and in narrow principles.

As to the partial ban, it may be recalled that my delegation had, on 13 June, put forward the possibility of a cessation of atmospheric, outer space and under water tests, while relegating the solution of the more thorny underground tests to some future date. And in this regard we asked "would it not be possible for both parties to give a little here and a little there and arrive at a settlement?" (ENDC/PV.55, p.34). Therefore we were pleased to note that our appeal, which was

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

shared by all other non-aligned colleagues, has been partially granted. And we say "partially", advisedly, since document ENDC/59 envisages the cessation of tests in the three environments, but it has not yet been coupled with the desire, on both sides, to meet our other condition, namely, that "both parties give a little here and a little there", in order to reach a settlement.

We refuse to believe that, after having come so close to an agreement banning tests in those three most dangerous environments, both parties will not show the imagination, the courage and indeed the spirit of mutual accommodation necessary to bridge the final two or three steps. It will indeed be a tragedy, if, because of sheer insistence on positions of principle -- one on a moratorium on underground tests and the other on no mention of underground tests at all -- they let slip perhaps their final chance of agreement. A few months from today other so far non-nuclear Powers may have turned into nuclear Powers, as has been said by the "New York Times". Agreement then would be made all the more difficult by the introduction of extraneous elements into the present test ban talks.

Therefore, we submit that both parties' positions are not tenable, or should be final, and that a solution can still be found, a solution which is neither an unlimited moratorium or undertaking, nor complete silence on underground tests; a workable provisional solution -- perhaps in the nature of the declaration envisaged by Mr. Barrington on 3 September -- which should not necessarily satisfy the Soviet Union or the United States 100 per cent, but should satisfy both, nevertheless, and fulfil meantime a useful task while talks for a comprehensive treaty banning all tests for ever are going on.

Let me remind the Committee of Mr. Godber's statement on 27 August when he said:

"Both those offers are new offers, which go substantially further to meet the Soviet Union than previous offers. Neither of those offers is an ultimatum; neither offer is on the basis of 'take it or leave it'; both offers are negotiable." (ENDC/PV.75, p.20, 21)

May I add that the purpose of negotiation is exactly this idea of give and take, of mutual accommodation which should bring about the formula of neither an unlimited moratorium or undertaking, nor complete silence on underground tests, which may be tantamount to giving them a green light -- the formula which the

(Mr. Fattah Hassan, United Arab Republic)

whole world is awaiting from the three nuclear Powers. The stakes are too high for our co-Chairmen to refuse to make another try. What we suggest is certainly worth trying, in order to provide the propitious atmosphere conducive to fruitful negotiation on the comprehensive test ban treaty and the disarmament treaty.

If the two Western draft test ban treaties are really negotiable, as their sponsors claim them to be, and if they are sincere efforts, which we know they are, then we submit that no stone should be left unturned to give them every chance of being accepted by the other party. And to the other party we also appeal that, if a genuine and sincere compromise should be coming from the two Western nuclear Powers along the lines we are suggesting, or along similar lines indicated by our colleagues from the non-aligned member States, again in all fairness they have to be met half way and appreciated for what they truly are. We have come so close to agreement that mankind will not forgive the party which turns a deaf ear to the voice of conciliation, tolerance and fairness. We hope that the nuclear Powers will not disappoint the hopes which the whole of humanity have pinned on their efforts.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In view of the late hour I would propose for your consideration, Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee, that this meeting be terminated and that the speakers still on the list -- I think that my Italian colleague will be in agreement with this -- be heard at Friday morning's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): Are there any objections to that proposal? Then it is so decided that those representatives on today's list who have not spoken will be on the list of speakers for Friday morning.

Before adjourning, I want to make a short proposal. As I mentioned at the beginning of the meeting today the Committee has before it document ENDC/61, the "Draft Report to the United Nations recommended by the two co-Chairmen." In order to facilitate adoption of the report by the Committee may I suggest the following procedure, which meets with the approval of the two co-Chairmen?

All delegations wishing to make observations, suggestions or remarks concerning the draft report may address them as soon as possible directly to the co-Chairmen. The co-Chairmen will then be able to take them into consideration

(The Chairman, Romania)

and to give us at our next meeting on Friday a text incorporating such observations as members of the Committee think fit to formulate. This procedure will avoid supplementary meetings and will facilitate adoption of the report on Friday. It certainly implies supplementary work for the co-Chairmen, but they have shown on many occasions their readiness to make our work easy.

Are there any observations on this procedure? Since I hear none, I take it that the proposal is adopted by the Committee.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think there has been distributed to all members of the Conference a paragraph which has been agreed upon with my co-Chairman, which will go on page 5 of the draft report just above III. This paragraph will replace the present text, and reads as follows:

"At the eighty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on 5 September 1962 the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests continue to meet in Geneva during the recess."

I must apologize for having inadvertently omitted to mention that my colleague from the United Kingdom had also agreed to this language, and to its replacing the present paragraph on page 5.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): Does that text meet with the approval of all the delegations mentioned in the proposal made by the representative of the United States? Is this phrase also to be incorporated in the communique or is it simply to be inserted in the report on page 5?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I would not think it necessary to mention it specifically in the communique because it is just a further drafting change in the proposed report which we will, I assume, take up on Friday.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): Members of the Committee will take into account the modification which has just been made by the representative of the United States with the agreement of the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United Kingdom.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eightieth and eighty-first plenary meetings at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Malitza, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Mexico, the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland and the United Arab Republic.

"The co-Chairmen tabled a draft report<sup>1/</sup> to the United Nations for the consideration of the Conference.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 September 1962, at 10 a.m."

---

1/ ENDC/61

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.